JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
Scoring in Soccer
Soccer is the world's favorite sport. Roughly two out of every three people on Earth are estimated to have watched at least part of the last World Cup tournament, held in Japan and Korea in 2002. Yet soccer has been criticized at times for lack of scoring. The paucity of goal scoring leads to frequent ties.
Many people, though not necessarily soccer purists, consider a 0-0 game to be especially unappealing.
Beyond considerations of spectator enjoyment, in certain situations a winner must be chosen. Thus ties need to be bro ken. Sometimes an overtime period is played, very often resulting in no additional goals. If the contest is still tied after the overtime, the outcome may be decided by penalty kicks. In both the 1994 World Cup (men's) and the 1999 Women's World Cup, the championship game of the tournament was determined by penalty kicks. Though exciting, the penalty kick process?-in which players from each team take turns taking shots at the opposite team's goalie?has been heavily criti cized as an unsatisfactory way to choose a victor. (For one thing, teamwork is not involved.)
Attempts to tweak the rules to increase scoring in order to make ties and penalty kicks less frequent have so far been unsuccessful. The rule makers do not want to change the nature of a game that contains many subtle aspects.
Where the science of probability can help is in predicting the effects of scoring rates on the incidence of ties. We can do this by applying the following simple Poisson process model: assume that goal scoring occurs randomly in time, with the time of each goal being independent of the times of all other goals. Further assume that the rate of scoring does not change with time?i.e., that the probability of scoring a goal in the time interval (f, t + At) does not depend on t. Then it can be shown that the probability that a team scores k goals within a _Prob(0-0 game) Prob(tie)
Regulation game: 8.5% 27.2%
Playoff game with 30 min. sudden death overtime: 3.9% 12.5% Table 1 . The frequencies of 0-0 scores and ties using 2002 World Cup scoring rates.
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Thus, at the rate of scoring seen in the 2002 World Cup, more than one out of four regulation games can be expected to end in a tie, and one out of eight playoff games will need to be decided by penalty kicks.
Applying the above percentages to the 2002 World Cup tournament, which consisted of forty-eight regulation games followed by sixteen playoff games, about four or five 0-0 games should have occurred. There were in fact three such games. The model also predicts about thirteen ties among the regulation games (27.2% x 48), and two ties in the elimination round (12.5% x 16), an almost perfect match to the fourteen ties in regulation games and two in playoff games that actual ly occurred. Now let's see how much the frequencies of 0-0 games and ties are reduced if the rate of goal scoring is increased by 25%. Playoff game with 30 min. sudden death overtime: 1.7% 9.0% Table 2 . The frequencies of 0-0 scores and ties predicted assuming a 25% increase in the number of goals per minute.
The incidence of 0-0 games is cut roughly in half, while the decrease in the frequency of ties in general is much less dra matic. It seems that ties (and the likelihood of penalty kicks)
are not easily avoided merely by a modest increase in scoring.
You may wish to compute the effects on the above probabili ties of doubling the goal scoring rate, a drastic change from soccer as it is currently played.
The Length of the World Series
Three of America's four major professional sports (base ball, basketball, and hockey) use a "best-of-seven" format for most rounds of their leagues' playoff tournaments. This means that the team that wins the majority of the seven games is declared the winner of the series. In practice, the series ends as soon as one team has won four games, since there is no need to play further games. Thus a series may last four, five, six, or seven games.
Occasionally when a series goes the full seven games, accu sations are made that the series was extended on purpose, due to the wishes of the league and/or the television network cov ering the series, for the financial gain that results from having extra games. If there has indeed been a tendency for such con spiracies, it might not be provable in a specific instance but should be detectable in playoff data recorded over the years. To properly judge the significance of this excess number of seven game series, we can do some additional analyses. By arguments similar to the one above, it is not hard to show (try!) that the full probability distribution of World Series length under our model is: Prob(4 games) = 1/8, Prob(5 games) = 1/4, Prob(6 games) = Prob(7 games) = 5/16. This is an exam ple of a negative binomial distribution. Table 3 . The predicted distribution for the lengths of ninety-five
World Series compared to actual records for the lengths of the series.
We can see that there have been both more long (seven game) series and more sweeps (four game series) than the model predicts (and fewer six game series). As a result, the agreement between the actual average series length and the expected average series length for our model is excellent, giv ing some evidence that conspiracy theories about extending series on purpose are probably without merit.
What accounts for the discrepancies in the 
